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LET THEM EAT CAKE: SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS,
PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND THE DIGITAL
RIGHTS REVOLUTION
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Revolutions – both intellectual and societal – occur when paradigms
of thought are no longer useful, explanatory, or shared. In law, such a
revolution in legal rights may advance through paradigm-shifts: a judicial or legislative rejection of legal constructs that do not adequately
and fairly account for the nature of the rights at stake. This Article
investigates a revolution in the digital rights arising from social media
account ownership. Emerging judicial precedent confirms that traditional notions of common law property rights are challenged and
transformed when applied to this digital technology, social media. Divergent and inconsistent outcomes in the adjudication of social media
account ownership disputes create legal anomalies. This increases the
risk exposure for business organizations who view social media as a
strategically important business asset and digital tool. Using a historical perspective on the development of common law property rights in
the Anglo-American legal tradition, this Article investigates the feasibility of adopting a new legal paradigm. This Article proposes a uniform and coherent approach to the categorization and application of
property rights to social media account ownership disputes that mitigates risks to business organizations.
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THE DIGITAL RIGHTS REVOLUTION:
THE LEGAL REGIME FALLS

“In a revolution, as in a novel, the most difficult part to invent
is the end.”3
Revolutions – both intellectual and societal – occur when paradigms of thought are no longer useful, explanatory, or shared.4 In law,
such a revolution in legal rights may advance through paradigm-shifts
2. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, SHAKESPEARE’S THE TEMPEST: A MODERN ENGLISH
TRANSLATION, act 2, sc. 1 (Morgan D. Rosenberg trans., Algora Publ’g 2013).
3. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, The Recollections of Alexis de Tocqueville 59 (1948) (“[F]or in a
rebellion, as in a novel, the most difficult part to invent is the end.”). The word “rebellion” used
in the original is widely translated and quoted as “revolution.” See Find Quotes, GOODREADS,
https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/search?utf8=%E2%9C%93&q=in+a+revolution%2C
+as+in+a+novel%2C+the+most+difficult+part+to+invent+is+the+end&commit+Search (last
visited Aug.7, 2020).
4. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 50TH ANNIVERSARY
EDITION 92–93 (4th ed. 2012) (advocating in his ground-breaking book the theory that revolutions in scientific thought mirror processes at work in political revolutions. When existing scientific theoretical paradigms or governance institutions no longer adequately account for or
explain problems, so-called anomalies arise in a laboratory experiment or a society. “Political
revolutions are inaugurated by a growing sense, often restricted to a segment of the political
community, that existing institutions have ceased adequately to meet the problems posed by an
environment that they have in part created. In much the same way, scientific revolutions are
inaugurated by a growing sense, again often restricted to a narrow subdivision of the scientific
community, that an existing paradigm has ceased to function adequately in the exploration of an
aspect of nature to which that paradigm itself had previously led the way. In both political and
scientific development the sense of malfunction that can lead to crisis is prerequisite to revolution.”); David Kaiser, In Retrospect: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 484 NATURE 164,
166 (2012). The author’s exegesis of Thomas Kuhn’s innovative work on the development of
scientific theory explains that thought revolutions resolve anomalies – “findings that differ from
expectations” – through paradigm-shifts: “[b]ut once enough anomalies have accumulated, and
all efforts to assimilate them to the paradigm have met with frustration, the field enters a state of
crisis. Resolution comes only with a revolution, and the inauguration of a new paradigm that can
address the anomalies.”
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that develop through a judicial or legislative rejection of legal constructs that do not adequately and fairly account for the nature of the
rights at stake.5 This revolution takes shape when divergent and inconsistent legal outcomes create anomalies that neither the rightsholders nor the rights-adjudicators can continue to abide:
In Kuhnian terms, divergences between reality and law or legal theory lead to the development of a new paradigm. In contract, rules
are changed and new standards asserted to close the gap. The paradox is that the revolution is not based on a sudden dramatic insight
or event, but is based upon a steady build-up of changes in reality,
and law’s response or lack of response to those changes.6

A revolution in digital rights – the legal regime governing technological innovations of the digital revolution7 – mirrors this process.
This digital rights revolution is paradoxically slow and painstaking
even as the technological environment in which these rights operate
shifts and changes at a rapid pace.8 Scholars theorize that this “catand-mouse chase game between the law and technology will probably
5. Larry A. DiMatteo, Unframing Legal Reasoning: A Cyclical Theory of Legal Evolution, 27
S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 483, 513 (2018). This Article discusses the application of Thomas Kuhn’s
paradigm-shift theory to the development of new legal standards. The author’s analysis examines
the broader context of how different theories of legal development inform debates on the nature
of legal reasoning.
6. Id.
7. The digital revolution is an imprecise, elastic term used by scholars to discuss technological
developments that include the internet, Mark Cooper, Why Growing Up is Hard to Do: Institutional Challenges for Internet Governance in the “Quarter-Life Crisis” of the Digital Revolution,
11 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 45, 51 (2013), digital information sharing, Alberto B.
Lopez, Posthumous Privacy, Decedent Intent, and Post-Mortem Access to Digital Assets, 24 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 183, 183–84 (2016), digital assets, Natalie M. Banta, Electronic Wills and Digital
Assets: Reassessing Formality in the Digital Age, 71 BAYLOR L. REV. 547, 549 (2019), and a broad
array of technological advances such as “processing power and storage capacity, the steady miniaturization of computing, ubiquitous communications and networking capabilities, and the digitization of all data,” Ryan Hagemann et al., Soft Law for Hard Problems: The Governance of
Emerging Technologies in an Uncertain Future, 17 COLO. TECH. L.J. 37, 57 (2018).
8. See Hagemann et al., supra note 7, at 38. Technological change outpaces the law’s ability to
adequately and appropriately address technology-driven legal problems:
The underlying drivers of the modern computing and Internet revolution microprocessors, networked technologies, software, sensors, wireless geolocation, and
other digital devices and applications - are invading numerous precincts of the economy
and upending the way business is done in a wide variety of sectors. These new technological capabilities are accelerating the well-known pacing problem: technology evolves
faster than the law’s ability to keep up. As a result, these new and rapidly-evolving
technologies and sectors will present formidable challenges to traditional regulatory
regimes and will necessitate the formulation of new governance processes. Id.
The authors argue that the pace of innovation in certain technology sectors as well as the global
impacts of these technological advancements usher in a new governance model based on soft
law—standards and norms followed by the industry market participants which are non-binding
and unenforceable under hard law regulatory regimes. Id. at 41.
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always tip in favor of technology”9 because the technology itself – the
digitization of information flowing through the internet – is qualitatively different than predecessor communication technologies, such as
the telephone and the television, and is inherently disruptive.10 This
relentless march towards technological advancements, as well as the
speed of consumer adoption of these technologies,11 creates a “pacing
problem”12 in which the law and regulation lag behind technology creation and use.
This pacing problem, inherent in the digital rights revolution, produces inconsistent and divergent judicial outcomes to a legal question
that is of strategic importance to business organizations: is a social
media account a form of property that confers property rights in the
social media account? Emerging judicial precedent on this legal question confirms the existence of a digital rights revolution in which traditional notions of property rights are challenged and transformed when
applied to this form of digital technology—social media.13
This Article first examines how this digital rights revolution involving social media account ownership disputes causes the current legal
regime to fall. This Article then evaluates the risk this regime failure
9. Adam Thierer, The Pursuit of Privacy in a World Where Information Control Is Failing, 36
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 409, 432 (2013) (quoting Konstantinos K. Stylianou, Hasta La Vista
Privacy, or How Technology Terminated Privacy, PERSONAL DATA PRIVACY AND PROTECTION
IN A SURVEILLANCE ERA: TECHNOLOGIES AND PRACTICES 44, 54 (Christina Akrivopoulou &
Athanasios-Efstratios Psygkas eds., 2011)).
10. Id. at 432 (The author investigates privacy interests in relation to the internet’s use of
digital communication networks and explains this digital technology poses unprecedented challenges because “it is innately resistant to control.”).
11. Hagemann et al., supra note 7, at 59 (contrasting the number of Americans that purchased
telephones, which reached 25% of the population more than thirty years after the technology
became available, with the seven-year time lag for American consumer adoption of internet
access to reach a similar purchase percentage. American consumer adoption of smart phone and
tablet technology outpaced internet access adoption.).
12. Id. at 59 (quoting WENDELL WALLACH, A DANGEROUS MASTER: HOW TO KEEP TECHNOLOGY FROM SLIPPING BEYOND OUR CONTROL 395 (2015)). The “pacing problem” referred to
by scholars is the “gap between the introduction of a new technology and the establishment of
laws, regulations, and oversight mechanisms for shaping its safe development.”
13. See infra Parts II.B.1, 2; Digital technology arguably provides the “external shock to the
relevancy of existing law” that forces the re-thinking and replacement of an existing legal regime. DiMatteo, supra note 5, at 508 (acknowledging the Industrial Revolution’s role in the
development of the Uniform Commercial Code, an adaptation to new and different forms of
contractual relations that emerged from this transformational economic and societal change).
The author notes that alternative models of legal development provide different theoretical
frameworks in which to analyze this phenomenon. Id. at 510 (delineating gradualism – a theory
of legal development that identifies the development of common law as a centuries-long maturation process – from a Kuhnian paradigm-shift theory of legal development in which the “most
rational model would combine the case-by-case gradualism of common law with intermittent
paradigm-shifts or legal ‘jumps’ ”).
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poses to business organizations. Specifically, in Part II, this Article investigates the data on the critical importance of this legal question to
business organizations who view social media accounts as both a valuable business asset and a strategic tool used to execute core business
functions.14 Part II then analyzes the current legal regime in the
United States that addresses the legal question of whether property
rights exist in social media accounts.15 The legal rules used to address
this question are judicially-created.16 The legal frameworks used by
courts to analyze this property rights question are analytically inconsistent and lack coherence and uniformity. This creates anomalies in
the legal precedent. Part II of this Article next examines how these
anomalies impact business organizations as they attempt to protect a
valuable business asset: social media accounts.17 The risk to business
organizations increases as the predictive power and reliability of this
precedent decreases.
Parts III and IV of this Article examine the feasibility of judicial
and legislative adoptions of a new paradigm that applies consistent
and analytically coherent legal rules to property rights disputes in social media accounts.18 Part III asks whether the past is prologue: Can
a paradigm-shift emerge from an understanding of legal history?19 In
Part III, this Article uses a historical lens to investigate how property
rights in the Anglo-American legal tradition evolved.20 In Part IV, this
legal history informs an evaluation of whether a new legal paradigm to
address the property rights at issue in social media accounts can be
judicially- or legislatively-created.21 Part IV of this Article analyzes
the use of a proposed judicial or legislative framework to mitigate risk
to business organizations.22
II.

SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNT OWNERSHIP DISPUTES: THE RISKS
TO BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS

Social media23 – the digital revolution’s 1997 game changer24 – impacts a range of societal behavior in profound and significant ways.
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Parts II.B.1, 2.
17. See infra Part II.C.
18. See infra Parts III, IV.
19. See infra Part III.
20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra Part IV.
22. See infra Part IV.
23. Social media has been defined as “forms of electronic communication (such as websites
for social networking and microblogging) through which users create online communities to
share information, ideas, personal messages, and other content (such as videos).” Rachel E. Van-
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Studies confirm the widespread adoption of this digital tool both in
the United States and globally. A 2018 report documented 4.02 billion
internet users globally, which is 53% of the total population worldwide, with users active on social media reaching 3.2 billion, which is
42% of the world’s population.25 In 2019, the Pew Research Center
reported a 67% increase in social media use in the United States adult
population from 5% use in 2005 to 72% use in 2019.26 This data echoes a social media use-rate globally that is similarly high in many developed countries, such as South Korea, Australia, Sweden, Canada,
and Israel,27 as well as a use-rate in developing economies that is
quickly approaching that of the advanced economies.28 In the United
States, social media use and engagement influence a wide range of
individual and societal behaviors, magnifying the importance and impact of this digital innovation.29

Landingham, Jailing the Twitter Bird: Social Media, Material Support to Terrorism, and Muzzling
the Modern Press, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 10 (2017) (quoting Social Media, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/social%20media (last visited July 20, 2020));
Susan Park & Patricia Sanchez Abril, Digital Self-Ownership: A Publicity-Rights Framework for
Determining Employee Social Media Rights, 53 AM. BUS. L. J. 537, 538 (2016) (“The term ‘social
media’ encompasses any online platform that allows individuals to communicate, create content,
and interact socially. Social media can include blogs, wikis, podcasts, photos and video sharing,
virtual worlds, and social networking sites such as LinkedIn, Facebook, Instagram, and
Twitter.”).
24. The roots of social media extend back to 1997 with the launch of a nascent form of a social
networking site called SixDegrees.com. Gil Press, Why Facebook Triumphed Over All Other
Social Networks, FORBES (Apr. 8, 2018, 4:11 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/2018/04/
08/why-facebook-triumphed-over-all-other-social-networks/#4df21e0e6e91.
25. Atanu Shaw, How Social Media Can Move Your Business Forward, FORBES (May 11,
2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbescommunicationscouncil/2018/05/11/how-social-media-can-move-your-business-forward/#33797dfc4cf2.
26. Brooke Auxier et al., 10 Tech-related Trends that Shaped the Decade, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec.
20, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/12/20/10-tech-related-trends-that-shapedthe-decade/.
27. A 2018 Pew Research Center study reported that “two-thirds or more” of adults in these
countries engaged in social media use. Jacob Poushter et al., Social Media Use Continues to Rise
in Developing Countries but Plateaus Across Developed Ones, PEW RES. CTR. (June 19, 2018),
https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2018/06/19/social-media-use-continues-to-rise-in-developing-countries-but-plateaus-across-developed-ones/.
28. Id. (“When it comes to social media use, people in emerging and developing markets are
fast approaching levels seen in more advanced economies.”).
29. The Pew Research Center reports that social media is not merely used for socializing,
noting that “we have documented how social media play a role in the way people participate in
civic and political activities, launch and sustain protests, get and share health information, gather
scientific information, engage in family matters, perform job-related activities and get news.”
Lee Rainie, Americans’ Complicated Feelings About Social Media in an Era of Privacy Concerns,
PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 27, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/03/27/americanscomplicated-feelings-about-social-media-in-an-era-of-privacy-concerns/.
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A. The Strategic Business Importance of Social Media Accounts
Social media plays a critical role in business organizations’ outreach
to this increasingly networked segment of the population; business operations’ core functions executed through social media include brand
management, marketing and advertising, sales, and corporate culturebuilding.30 Data on business use of social media underscores the increasing importance of this business tool to a wide array of industries:
• A 2019 report surveying 1,800 business organizations across a
range of industries including consumer products, financial services, e-commerce, and travel and tourism confirms: “[s]ocial
media marketing has been around for many years now, and the
majority of marketers sees it as an important part of their overall strategy. [58%] of marketers say social media is ‘[v]ery important’, with 30[%] saying it’s ‘[s]omewhat important.’”31
• 92% of business-to-business marketing executives share content
over social media.32
• A 2019 report surveying 1,800 business organizations found that
various social media platforms are used by business organizations with the following top five garnering the greatest social
media account use by business organizations: Facebook (93.7%);
Twitter (84.4%); Instagram (80.9%); LinkedIn (70%); and YouTube (60.8%).33
• 65.6% of 1,800 business organizations responding to a 2019 survey stated they planned to increase their social media advertising budget in 2019.34
• 69% of 5,700 marketers surveyed in 2017 reported using social
media to develop brand loyalty.35
30. Leslie K. John et al., Ads that Don’t Overstep, 96 HARV. BUS. REV. 62, at 62, 64 (2018);
Kiely Kuligowski, Social Media for Business: A Marketer’s Guide, BUS. NEWS DAILY (Oct. 2,
2020), https://www.businessnewsdaily.com/7832-social-media-for-business.html; 2019 Report,
State of Social: How Marketers Across the Globe Think About Social Media, What’s Working,
How the Industry is Changing, and More, BUFFER, https://buffer.com/state-of-social-2019 (last
visited Oct. 13, 2020); James Mulvey, Social Media in 2020: 11 Data-Backed Predictions, HOOTSUITE (Apr. 10, 2018), https://blog.hootsuite.com/social-media-2020/.
31. BUFFER, 2019 Report, supra note 30; see also Shea Bennett, 88% of Brands Will Use Social
Media Marketing in 2014 [Study], ADWEEK (Nov. 14, 2013), https://www.adweek.com/digital/
smm-2014/ (88% of surveyed U. S. companies with 100 or more employees planned to market
using social media platforms in 2014, an increase from previous years.).
32. Shea Bennett, 92% of B2B Marketers Use Social Media to Share Content, ADWEEK (Feb.
23, 2015), https://www.adweek.com/digital/b2b-marketing-channels-content/.
33. 2019 Report, State of Social: How Marketers Across the Globe Think About Social Media,
What’s Working, How the Industry is Changing, and More, supra note 30.
34. Id.
35. See Shaw, supra note 25 (noting that 69% of 5,700 marketers surveyed in 2017 reported
using social media to develop brand loyalty).
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Business organizations use social media as a key driver of profitability, investing in outcomes to achieve measurable impacts on consumer
decisions.36 A substantial majority of surveyed marketers report that
they use social media to shape brand loyalty.37 In a 2018 report on
global social media use, the findings confirmed that “almost half of
internet users follow brands they like or brands they are thinking of
buying something from on social media.”38
With over 4 billion documented internet users,39 the digital revolution, in general, and social media use, in particular, provide business
organizations an unprecedented opportunity to dramatically impact
their marketing and sales to potential customers and clients. These
customers and clients increasingly use social media to conduct product
research; this consumer behavior is linked to the use of social media to
engage in e-commerce as well, ushering in social media as a sales engine or digital storefront:40
From product galleries on Instagram to product launches on
Facebook Live, social content is already used by younger
demographics to discover and evaluate products. As more consumers research potential purchases on social networks, it’s a short leap
to buying directly on Facebook, Pinterest, or Instagram. Chatbots
will help consumers transition to social commerce, making it easy
and seamless to discover products, ask questions, process digital
payments, and see automatic updates on your order’s delivery
date.41

Social media use as a powerful consumer vehicle for digital window
shopping, product research, and potentially product purchases is reflected in data: “[g]lobally, online consumers spend one-third of their
time on social media.”42 Social media use for consumer purchases ex36. John et al., supra note 30, at 62, 64. Online data about consumers allows marketers to
identify and respond to consumer behavior, positively impacting the performance of advertising
launched by these marketers:
With users regularly sharing personal data online and web cookies tracking every click,
marketers have been able to gain unprecedented insight into consumers and serve up
solutions tailored to their individual needs. The results have been impressive. Research
has shown that digital targeting meaningfully improves the response to advertisements
and that ad performance declines when marketers’ access to consumer data is reduced.
Id.
37. See Shaw, supra note 25.
38. Mulvey, supra note 30.
39. Shaw, supra note 25.
40. Mulvey, supra note 30 (“Globally, online consumers spend one third of their time on social media.”).
41. Id.
42. Id.
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tends as well to services such as banking, where social media messaging is used for banking transactions on mobile platforms.43
Cited benefits to business engagement on social media platforms
include brand awareness, brand personality, thought leadership, increased website traffic, reputation management, analytics and insights,
competitor analysis, and targeted advertisements.44 An additional use
of social media by business organizations is corporate culturebuilding:
Whether tracking employee perceptions of new leaders to prioritizing critical problems in corporate culture, social data will become a
new area of advantage. Using publicly available data (such as comments on Instagram or perceptions on LinkedIn), social data will
provide a true look into the health of an employer brand.45

Business organizations’ embrace of social media as a critically important business tool and the significant impact social media has on
profitability leads to litigation over the ownership rights in social media accounts. A kaleidoscope of legal theories is advanced by litigants,
and the judicial analyses courts employ to adjudicate these social media account ownership disputes result in divergent and inconsistent
outcomes across jurisdictions, creating risk exposure for business
organizations.46
B. Divergent and Inconsistent Judicial Outcomes in Ownership
Disputes
The strategic importance of social media account ownership and
control to business organizations invariably leads to litigation over the
nature of these digital rights and the available remedies. Legal scholarship documents both the proliferation of this litigation as well as the
need for an analytically sound legal framework and approach to categorizing and adjudicating these digital rights.47 Evidence of the digital
43. Id.
44. Kuligowski, supra note 30.
45. Mulvey, supra note 30.
46. See infra Part II.B.2.
47. Kathleen McGarvey Hidy, Business Disputes over Social Media Accounts: Legal Rights,
Judicial Rationales, and the Resultant Business Risks, 2018 COL. BUS. L. REV. 426, 433 (detailing
the emerging judicial precedent from social media account ownership litigation which is “a kaleidoscope of judicial rationales used by courts to define and delineate the legal rights over these
social media accounts.”); Park & Sanchez Abril, supra note 23, at 541 (The authors propose a
framework derived from a publicity rights approach for post-employment disputes over control
of social media accounts. In their examination of relevant caselaw, the authors conclude: “Analysis of these cases reveals that this legal question does not fit neatly into conventional interpretations or areas of law. Is this a matter of property law? Or perhaps contract law? Do we engage
the law of trade secrets to resolve these issues? Or is intellectual property or tort law better
suited to address them?”); Zoe Argento, Whose Social Network Account? A Trade Secret Ap-
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rights’ pacing problem emerges from caselaw—the judicial forum for
the adjudication of these disputes. This evidence demonstrates that
courts struggle to select and apply clear and consistent legal rules and
principles that allow them to analyze and adjudicate the property
rights question embedded in these disputes. The judicial precedent
arising from litigation over social media account ownership disputes
creates divergent and inconsistent outcomes; anomalies in the law
where the analytical framework or paradigm used by various courts to
identify and adjudicate these property rights is neither uniform nor
logically coherent.
1. The Littered Litigation Landscape
Courts adjudicate disputes arising from the ownership and control
of social media accounts under both federal and state law; this litigation landscape is littered with legal theories of recovery that obscure
essential questions about the nature of the property embedded in
these lawsuits and what legal rights should attach to those property
interests.48 What is clear from an analysis of the caselaw is that courts
provide idiosyncratic interpretations of whether and how a legal theory of recovery applies to a dispute over social media account
control.49
The question of whether intellectual property rights arise from social media accounts confounds the courts as they apply an array of
intellectual property regimes to social media account disputes. These
courts adopt various rationales to justify the logic of the distinctions
they make as they apply intellectual property law to the unique features of each kind of social media platform. In Christou v. Beatport,
the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado identified a MySpace friends list as a possible trade secret protectable under Colorado
proach to Allocating Rights, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 201, 277 (2013) (advocating
for the adoption of a legal regime that grants trade secret protection to social media account
passwords, vesting control over exclusive access to the account to the holder of the trade secret).
48. Hidy, supra note 47, at 472: “The jurisprudence involving disputes about control over social media accounts has addressed a variety of issues: property rights, the right to control property, interference with economic opportunities or contractual relationships through
misappropriation of that control, intellectual property violations, fiduciary duties, privacy rights,
and the valuation of social media accounts and damages calculations.”
49. The legal question of ownership and the legal question of control over a social media
account itself get muddled by litigants when asserting their rights over social media accounts.
PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11-03474 MEJ, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129229, at *11 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 8, 2011) (“PhoneDog further argues that, notwithstanding any ownership interest or right
to possession it has in the [Twitter] Account, it is entitled to damages based upon Mr. Kravitz’s
interference with its access to and use of the Account.”).
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law.50 This view echoed a ruling by a federal district court in California that refused to dismiss a trade secret theft claim brought under
California law in a Twitter account dispute.51 That district court ruled
that Twitter account followers as well as the password on the Twitter
account could constitute protectable trade secrets.52 In CDM Media
USA v. Simms, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois parsed the meaning of a trade secret as applied to different
aspects of another kind of social media account:53 LinkedIn. The district court examined a LinkedIn account’s protectability under the Illinois Trade Secrets Act54 and concluded that a LinkedIn membership
list could constitute a trade secret55 but a “LinkedIn group’s private
communications” could not.56
Other intellectual property rights asserted in disputes over social
media accounts include Lanham Act57 violations, common law tortious misappropriation of publicity,58 and common law tortious invasion of privacy through the misappropriation of identity.59 In
Maremont v. Fredman, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois ruled that Twitter and Facebook account followers can
constitute a “marketable commercial interest” satisfying the commercial interest requirement under the Lanham Act.60 The district court
found that a Lanham Act false endorsement claim could arise when
an employer tweets from a Twitter account in which ownership and
control of that account is disputed by an employee.61
In Eagle v. Morgan, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania rejected a claim asserting an unfair competition Lanham Act violation brought under Section 43(a), finding insufficient
50. Christou v. Beatport, LLC, 849 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1076 (D. Colo. 2012) (ascribing the trade
secret status of the MySpace friends list as a question of fact and refusing to dismiss the trade
secret claim on a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)).
51. PhoneDog, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129229, at *20.
52. Id. at *19–20.
53. CDM Media USA, Inc. v. Simms, No. 14 CV 9111, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37458, at *12
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2015).
54. 765 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 1065/2(d) et seq. (2020).
55. CDM Media USA, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37458, at *12–14.
56. Id. at *13–14. The federal district court did note that trade secrets may be contained in
LinkedIn private messaging, stating that this legal assertion must be made with a specificity that
ties the information in the LinkedIn message to the definition of what constitutes a trade secret
under Illinois law.
57. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012).
58. Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34220, at *23 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12,
2013).
59. Id. at *20–22.
60. Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Grp., No. 10 C 7811, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26557, at
*13 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2014).
61. Id. at *15–16.
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evidence of confused LinkedIn users over a disputed LinkedIn account.62 The Eagle court ruled that a business organization did violate
Pennsylvania’s common law tort of misappropriation of publicity, depriving its former executive of “an exclusive right to control the commercial value of her name and to prevent others from exploiting it
without her permission.”63 The evidence presented at trial illustrates
the efforts parties undertake to keep and control an existing social
media account. These efforts demonstrate the value inherent in an established social media account and reveal the economic motivations
driving parties to litigate social media account ownership disputes:
By using Plaintiff’s password to enter her LinkedIn account, changing the password to block Dr. Eagle from entering it, and then altering her account to reflect Sandi Morgan’s information – in lieu of
simply creating a new LinkedIn account for Ms. Morgan – Defendant Edcomm deprived Plaintiff of the commercial benefit of her
name.64

Additionally, the district court in Eagle held that the business organization’s use of the LinkedIn account established an invasion of
privacy through misappropriation of identity, a tort under Pennsylvania common law.65 In Pennsylvania, this tort recognizes misappropriation of the “reputation, prestige, social or commercial
standing, public interest or other values” derived from an individual’s
name or likeness.66 The LinkedIn account became the cyber real estate on which these interests sat. Control of this social media account
allowed the manipulation of these intangible but valuable interests.
These same interests – reputation and prestige – were at stake in
the disputed ownership and control of Facebook accounts and
Facebook pages.67 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Kentucky, on summary judgment adjudication, held a union’s ex-president liable for violating the union’s rights under Kentucky’s common
law invasion of privacy tort.68 The ex-president retained control over
the union’s social media accounts and “benefitted from the goodwill
62. Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143614, at *26–27 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 4,
2012).
63. Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34220, at *23 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12,
2013).
64. Id. at *23.
65. Id. at *20–22.
66. Id. at *20 (quoting Wallace v. MediaNews Group., Inc., No. 1:12-CV-0872, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7485, at *11 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2013) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652C cmt.c), aff’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds, Wallace v. MediaNews Group, Inc.,
No. 13-2079, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 11047 (3d Cir. June 13, 2014)).
67. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Local 651 v. Philbeck, 423 F. Supp. 3d 364, 375 (E.D. Ky. 2019).
68. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Local 651 v. Philbeck, 464 F. Supp. 3d 863, 873 (E.D. Ky. 2020).
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associated with the [u]nion’s reputation and prestige,” which were intangible but valuable interests embedded in the disputed Facebook
accounts and Facebook pages.69
Other legal theories courts confront in litigation over social media
account ownership and control include the tort of trespass,70 tortious
interference with economic and business opportunities,71 breach of fiduciary duty,72 civil conspiracy and unfair competition,73 civil theft,74
and contract-based rights.75 This precedent, along with the caselaw ad69. Id.
70. Salonclick, LLC v. SuperEgo Mgmt., LLC, No. 16 Civ. 2555 (KMW), 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6871, at *10–12 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2017) (The federal district court categorized a Twitter
account and Facebook page as “intangible property”; New York’s common law tort of trespass to
chattels requires a plaintiff to demonstrate “injury” to the social media accounts themselves, not
simply damage to business interests.).
71. Emerald City Mgmt., LLC v. Kahn, No. 4:14-cv-358, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2143, at
*62–68 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2016) (A question of fact remained for adjudication at trial on the issue
of whether social media account control constituted tortious interference with prospective business relationships under Texas common law.); PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11-03474 MEJ, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10561, at *2–4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2012) (ruling that the plaintiff had sufficiently pled a claim for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage through
disruption in advertising revenue directly related to the plaintiff’s loss of control over a Twitter
account.).
72. Keypath Educ., Inc. v. BrightStar Educ. Grp., No. 16-cv-2545-JWL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14061, at *9 (D. Kan. Jan. 31, 2017) (Applying Kansas law, a federal district court refused to
dismiss a breach of fiduciary duty claim brought by a company that alleged a social media management company had an implied fiduciary relationship with the company when it “established
itself as the owner of those social media accounts . . . and Select Education was unable to access
those [social media] accounts without permission from Keypath.”); Salonclick, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6871, at *13 (A business organization alleged breach of fiduciary duty under New York
law against an independent contractor who created a Twitter account and was given administrative access to a Facebook page.); Emerald City Mgmt. LLC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2143, at
*59–60 (A federal district court recognized a breach of fiduciary duty claim under Texas law
brought by an employer against its former employee who registered “the various [social] media
accounts and website in his own name” and then locked his employer out of the social media
accounts when he left that employment.).
73. Farm Journal, Inc. v. Johnson, No. 4:19-cv-00095-SRB, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69374, at
*23–27 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 24, 2019).
74. In Mazo v. Merritt, the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado refused to dismiss a
civil theft claim under Colorado law, categorizing social media accounts as “valuable property.”
Mazo v. Merritt, No. 18-cv-00831-RBJ, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12766, at *20 (D. Colo. Jan. 28,
2019). The district court ruled that the prima facie elements of civil theft under Colorado law
were pled in the social media account ownership dispute. Those elements are met when a plaintiff shows that a defendant “knowingly obtains, retains, or exercises control over anything of
value of another without authorization and intends to permanently keep it or prevent the true
owner from enjoying the thing’s use or benefit.” Id. at *21 (quoting Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-4401(1)(a)–(e) (2021)).
75. CDM Media USA, Inc. v. Simms, No. 14 CV 9111, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37458, at *10
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2015) (A senior executive entered into a non-compete agreement that included a clause related to disclosure of confidential information. The senior executive’s “failure
to transfer control of the LinkedIn group” may have violated this contractual provision when he
resigned and began working for his former employer’s customer.); Ardis Health, LLC v.
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judicating intellectual property rights, acknowledges the important economic and business-related interests at stake in these social media
account disputes. What is left unclear and uncertain in this precedent
is the nature of the property interests found in social media accounts
and the boundary lines for these property rights.
2. The Social Media Account as Common Law Personal Property
These fundamental questions are addressed through a legal theory
embedded for centuries in the Anglo-American legal tradition: the
common law tort of conversion.76 The Restatement 2d of Torts defines
conversion as follows:
(1) Conversion is an intentional exercise of dominion or control
over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of another
to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other
the full value of the chattel.
(2) In determining the seriousness of the interference and the justice of requiring the actor to pay the full value, the following factors
are important:
(a) the extent and duration of the actor’s exercise of dominion or
control;
(b) the actor’s intent to assert a right in fact inconsistent with the
other’s right of control;
(c) the actor’s good faith;
(d) the extent and duration of the resulting interference with the
other’s right of control;
(e) the harm done to the chattel;
(f) the inconvenience and expense caused to the other.77

Caselaw demonstrates that many litigants embroiled in social media
account ownership and control disputes allege tortious conversion of
this digital asset. Framing their legal rights as a property right violation under this tort necessitates that these litigants establish that the
digital property they are wrestling over, a social media account, is a
form of chattel or personal property.78 In its adjudication of this tort, a
court must first conceptually categorize the nature of the property itself: Is a social media account a form of chattel or personal property?
The legal theory of conversion then demands judicial analysis on the
question of ownership and control: Who has the right to control the
Nankivell, No. 11 Civ. 5013 (NRB), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120738, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19,
2011) (Work performed by an employee whose duties included maintaining social media accounts for a business organization’s online marketing of its products was subject to a work product agreement entered into at the time of the employee’s hiring.).
76. William L. Prosser, Nature of Conversion, CORNELL L.Q. Winter 1957, at 168, 169.
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 222A (AM. LAW INST. 2021).
78. Id.
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social media account and was that right to control interfered with by
the accused party?
The common law tort of conversion provides an analytical vehicle
to arrive at answers to these fundamental legal questions; however,
the judicial precedent does not drive to the desired destination. Judicial analyses of whether and how the tort of conversion applies to social media account ownership disputes are neither consistent nor
uniform. One roadblock is the difference in each state’s common law
articulation of the elements of the tort of conversion. As one scholar
predicted, the judicial categorization of social media accounts as personal property protectable from interference under the common law
tort of conversion leads to divergent and inconsistent outcomes:
The personal property approach has another flaw. Because many
states do not allow claims for conversion for intangible items the
law would not develop in a coherent manner.79

Some states recognize intangible property, such as social media accounts, as personal property subject to conversion claims; others do
not.
In Int’l Bhd. Of Teamster Local 651 v. Philbeck, the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky evaluated Kentucky’s common law tort of conversion in a dispute between a union and its expresident over the ownership and control of Facebook accounts.80 The
union brought an action in federal court seeking as a remedy the
“passwords and administrative access to a plethora of Facebook pages
and a permanent injunction to keep Defendant Michael Philbeck from
using the Facebook accounts.”81 The district court granted summary
judgment in the union’s favor on the conversion claim.82 Citing the
elements of the tort of conversion under Kentucky law, the district
court assumed that the Facebook pages constitute protectable property under this tort and focused its analysis on whether the union “is
the ‘owner’ of the social media accounts or whether Philbeck is the
‘owner’ of those accounts.”83 Specifically, the district court sought to
determine whether the disputed social media accounts were “business
or personal accounts.”84
The district court stated that the factors relevant to this inquiry are
whether the social media account was “originally created as a page for
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Argento, supra note 47, at 277–78.
Int’l Bhd. Of Teamster Local 651 v. Philbeck, 464 F. Supp. 3d 863, 867–68 (E.D. Ky. 2020).
Id. at 868.
Id. at 873.
Id. at 870.
Id. at 871.
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the businesses, brands, or organizations, and not an individual person”;85 whether the account “was directly linked to the business’s
website and posted status updates on the behalf of the business”;86
whether “many posts on the [Facebook] pages were business-related
and used for promotion”;87 and whether the business had given employees “access to post on the page [which] supported the conclusion
that the page was a business page.”88 Evidence that a business organization failed “to provide administrative privileges to another individual” or that the posting individual also used the social media account
for “personal reasons and used it to share personal posts” was not
dispositive on the issue of whether a social media account is a business
account or a personal account.89 The district court applied this framework and concluded:
Here, it has already been established that the Facebook page and
resource group are the property of the Union and the plaintiff had
the right to possess them at the time of the alleged conversion. The
defendant removed administrators and banned certain Union members from the Facebook page and resource group, which interferes
with the plaintiff’s right to use and enjoy the social media accounts.
Philbeck exercised control over the page in a manner inconsistent
with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment and the defendant’s actions
were the legal cause of the conversion. The plaintiff suffered damage because of the inaccurate information being disseminated to
members of the Union and it was hindered in its ability to communicate with the Union members.90

The Georgia Court of Appeals also ruled that a social media account constitutes protectable property under Georgia’s common law
tort of conversion.91 In Bearoff v. Craton, the appellate court heard an
appeal involving a dispute between affiliated companies doing business as Frisky Biscuit Couples Boutique (Frisky Biscuit) and owners
of a company doing business as The Love Library (Love Library).92
Frisky Biscuit, an adult novelty store, sued a competitor, Love Library, for the conversion of social media accounts, violation of a geographic prohibition in a non-compete agreement, and additional legal
85. Int’l Bhd. Of Teamster Local 651 v. Philbeck, 464 F. Supp. 3d 863, 871 (E.D. Ky. 2020).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Int’l Bhd. Of Teamster Local 651 v. Philbeck, 464 F. Supp. 3d 863, 872 (E.D. Ky. 2020). On
the matter of damages, the district court stated: “[i]t would be difficult to quantify how much the
social media accounts of the Union would be worth.” Id. at 878.
91. Bearoff v. Craton, 830 S.E.2d 362, 367 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019).
92. Id. at 366.
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claims.93 Frisky Biscuit alleged that its social media accounts, a
Facebook page and a Twitter account,94 were usurped by Love Library
to market and advertise its store.95
The Georgia appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling at a
bench trial that Love Library unlawfully converted the plaintiffs’ social media accounts and ruled: (i) Frisky Biscuit’s Facebook page and
Twitter account are a form of intangible property and, under Georgia
law, intangible property is subject to a conversion claim;96 (ii) the social media accounts served as collateral under a security agreement;97
and (iii) Love Library refused to transfer control over these social media accounts as required under that security agreement.98
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia also
adjudicated a Georgia common law conversion claim in a dispute over
ownership and control over social media accounts.99 It concluded as
well that social media accounts constitute protectable property under
this tort.100 In Mastermind Involvement Mktg. v. Art Inst. Of Atlanta,
the district court granted a preliminary injunction in favor of various
art institutes who were sued by a marketing company that performed
social media marketing services for these art institutes.101 The marketing company brought a breach of contract case against the art institutes for failure to pay; the art institutes asserted counterclaims
against the marketing company that included the common law tort
claim of conversion.102 The art institutes alleged that the marketing
company refused to “transfer back to them sixteen social media accounts (and the accounts’ login information) that MasterMind acquired control of pursuant to its contract with [Dream Center
Education Holding, LLC].”103
The district court concluded that the elements of a conversion claim
under Georgia law would likely be met by the art institutes; this justified a preliminary injunction ordering the marketing company to
93. Id. at 370.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 369.
96. Bearoff v. Craton, 830 S.E.2d 362, 375–76 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019).
97. Id. at 376.
98. Id. The appellate court also affirmed the trial court’s finding that the unlawful conversion
of the social media accounts by Love Library to directly compete with the plaintiffs’ business –
along with other misconduct by Love Library – justified the imposition of punitive damages
against it. Id. at 380.
99. Mastermind Involvement Mktg. v. Art Inst., 389 F. Supp. 3d 1291, 1294 (N.D. Ga. 2019).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1293.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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transfer back to the art institutes “the login information to the sixteen
social media accounts” to enable the art institutes to “access and exercise complete control over said social media accounts.”104 The district
court identified the factors relevant to its analysis, which included evidence of ownership, actual possession, and de facto control over the
disputed social media accounts:
The evidence in the record establishes that AII has valid legal title
to the social media accounts and login information; that MasterMind currently has actual possession of the social media accounts
and login information; that the AI Defendants and AII demanded
return of the accounts and login information, and that MasterMind
has refused to transfer back the accounts and login information to
the AI Defendants and AII.105

The district court noted business harms associated with the conversion: it found that the art institutes’ inability to market and advertise
through the social media accounts detrimentally impacted their “reputation and business.”106
Similarly, a permanent injunction was issued by a federal district
court in California for the unlawful conversion by a rival business of
social media accounts under California common law.107 The district
court ordered the business rival to return Facebook and Instagram accounts as well as all “codes, passwords, [and] credentials” associated
with those accounts.108 This ruling echoed a prior federal case in
which a federal district court ruled that under California’s common
law tort of conversion, a Twitter account is protectable property.109
In McGuire-Sobrino v. TX Cannalliance LLC, the Texas Court of
Appeals affirmed a trial court’s temporary injunction requested by
Cannalliance LLC, doing business as the Texas Cannabis Business Alliance (TCBA), an educational and support organization dedicated to
104. Mastermind Involvement Mktg. v. Art Inst., 389 F. Supp. 3d 1291, 1295 (N.D. Ga. 2019).
105. Id. at 1294.
106. Id. at 1295.
107. Left Coast Wrestling, LLC v. Dearborn Int’l LLC, No. 3:17-cv-00466-LAB-NLS, 2018
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86808, at *18 (S.D. Cal. May 23, 2018), adopted by Left Coast Wrestling, LLC
v. Dearborn Int’l LLC, No. 17cv466-LAB (NLS), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102546 (S.D. Cal. June
19, 2018). The court recited the elements of a conversion claim under California law and then
concluded defendant converted property owned by the plaintiff including “the websites and social media pages associated with” the plaintiff’s organization. Left Coast Wrestling, LLC, 2018
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86808, at *18.
108. Left Coast Wrestling, LLC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86808, at *50–51. This claim and additional legal claims were adjudicated based on a default judgment motion. Id. at *50.
109. PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11-03474 MEJ, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129229, at *26–27
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011). The court acknowledged the significance of the conversion claim in the
case. It stated it was at “the core of this lawsuit” and that at “this stage of the proceedings, the
Court finds that PhoneDog has adequately alleged that it owns or has the right to possess the
[Twitter] Account.”
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advancing awareness in Texas of the “issues and opportunities in the
Texas cannabis market.”110 TCBA employed Ephraim McGuireSobrino to set up and manage its “digital assets” which included
Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and LinkedIn social media accounts.111
The Texas Court of Appeals concluded that TCBA would likely succeed on the merits of its claim that its employee tortiously converted
its social media accounts.112 The Texas Court of Appeals reasoned
that the social media accounts, as well as other digital assets, were
property over which TCBA had “legal possession.”113 Evidence in the
record demonstrated that McGuire-Sobrino “exercised control over
the digital assets which interfered with TCBA’s right to the digital assets.”114 TCBA presented evidence of irreparable injury directly related to this interference—its inability to access the social media
accounts.115 This harm included business disruption, threatened injury
to a business organization’s goodwill and reputation, loss of clientele,
and loss of the ability to market in specific ways.116
While the law in states such as Georgia, Texas, Kentucky, and California recognize social media accounts as intangible property protected under the common law tort of conversion, other jurisdictions
have yet to rule on this issue, creating uncertainty in outcomes. In
Farm Journal, Inc. v. Johnson, an agricultural media company, Farm
Journal, Inc., sued Gregory Johnson, the company’s former editorial
director, as well as Johnson’s current employer, Blue Book Services,
Inc., its direct competitor.117 After he tendered his letter of resignation at Farm Journal, Inc., Johnson allegedly changed the Farm Journal, Inc. Twitter account handle he used to update Twitter followers
on company news and to link them to the company’s content –
@gregofthepacker118 – to a different Twitter handle –
@gregofthebluebook – redirecting the Farm Journal, Inc.’s Twitter account followers to Johnson’s new employer’s content.119
110. McGuire-Sobrino v. TX Cannalliance, LLC, No. 05-19-01261-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS
6281, at *1 (Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2020).
111. Id. at *1–2.
112. Id. at *19.
113. Id. at *18.
114. Id. at *18–19.
115. McGuire-Sobrino v. TX Cannalliance, LLC, No. 05-19-01261-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS
6281, at *12–13 (Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2020).
116. Id. at *3–4, 12–15.
117. Farm Journal, Inc. v. Johnson, No. 4:19-cv-00095-SRB, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69374, at
*2–3 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 24, 2019).
118. Id. at *5.
119. Id.
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The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri asserted in its opinion that Farm Journal, Inc.’s claim of common law
conversion – brought against its former employee, Johnson, and its
direct competitor, Blue Book Services, Inc., for redirecting the Twitter
account – satisfied all three elements required to prove this claim
under Missouri law.120 The business organization alleged the following: (1) it owned the disputed “Twitter account and it is entitled to
possess and control the account”;121 (2) the defendants “‘have tortiously taken’ the Twitter account and have used the account ‘to their
own purposes’”;122 and (3) Johnson and his new employer “deprived
Plaintiff of access to the Twitter account and ‘wrongfully claim a right
in opposition to’ Plaintiff’s right to the account.”123
While the district court concluded that social media accounts enjoy
protectable property rights under Missouri’s common law tort of conversion, it acknowledged two issues: a conflict of laws issue on
whether Missouri or Kansas law governed this legal question and, secondly, the lack of clear precedent on this legal question in both jurisdictions. The district court refused to rule on the conflict of laws issue,
citing the procedural posture of this case.124 Its analysis of the precedent under Kansas and Missouri law on the property rights question
embedded in this social media account ownership dispute proceeded
by negative implication:
At this stage in the case, this Court does not need to perform a
choice of law analysis. While neither Kansas nor Missouri courts
have decided whether a social media account can be the subject of a
conversion claim, no authority from either state requires this Court
to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim solely because the disputed property is a
Twitter account. Neither state’s conversion law draws a bright line
between physical personal property and intangible personal property, recognizing conversion claims for the former and rejecting
claims for the latter. Instead, their law suggests that whether disputed personal property can be subject to a conversion claim depends on whether the defendant’s possession or use of the
property—regardless of whether the property is physical or intangible—excludes the plaintiff’s rights in that property.
****
At bottom, each state’s law suggests that intangible personal property such as a plaintiff’s social media account may be the subject of
120. Id. at *18–19.
121. Id. at *18.
122. Farm Journal, Inc. v. Johnson, No. 4:19-cv-00095-SRB, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69374, at
*18 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 24, 2019).
123. Id.
124. Id. at *18, n.1. The district court’s ruling was pursuant to a motion to dismiss brought
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
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a conversion claim if it can be used or appropriated in a way that
excludes the plaintiff.125

The district court’s analysis underscores the difficulty courts have in
trying to excavate the legal principles to use when the precedent does
not clearly guide outcomes. This illustrates the pacing problem inherent in the digital rights revolution.
Confusion over applicable precedent and what legal rules to apply
has also arisen in cases involving New York law. In C.D.S., Inc. v.
Zetler, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
presided over a bench trial involving a global dispute between two
former business partners.126 The case involved allegations of unlawful
conversion of digital assets: Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram accounts.127 These social media accounts were set up and administered
by the company president,128 however, the company argued it retained the property rights in these accounts.129 The district court explained that the common law tort of conversion in New York involves
two “key” questions: Does the plaintiff have a “possessory right or
interest in the property” and is the defendant’s “dominion over the
property or interference with it, in derogation of plaintiff’s rights”?130
The district court ruled in favor of C.D.S., Inc., finding that it had a
possessory interest in these social media accounts and that the former
president of the company, Bradley Zetler, interfered with this possessory interest by failing to provide the passwords and administrator access codes of these accounts to C.D.S., Inc. when it terminated him.131
This analytical framework makes the determination of social media
ownership under this common law tort a fact-based inquiry. This requires a court to assess: who created the social media accounts; in
what capacity did that individual act; and for whose benefit was the
account set up, i.e., what was the motivation and purpose for setting
up the social media account?
Two other federal district courts applied New York’s common law
tort of conversion to social media account ownership disputes and
concurred that New York recognizes these digital assets as protectable
property interests under this legal theory. In Salonclick, LLC v. SuperEgo Mgmt., the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
125. Id.
126. C.D.S., Inc. v. Zetler, 298 F. Supp. 3d 727, 734 (S.D. NY. 2018).
127. Id. at 750.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 747 (quoting Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 860 N.E.3d 713, 717
(2006)).
131. C.D.S., Inc. v. Zetler, 298 F. Supp. 3d 727, 750 (S.D. NY. 2018).
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New York stated that although social media accounts are intangible
property, they “can be the object of conversion under New York
law.”132 Salonclick cited an earlier decision in which a federal court
ruled that “rights to the Access Information” to social media accounts
can be owned and “form the basis of a claim of conversion” under
New York common law.133
This line of precedent contradicts a ruling made in Fortified Holistic
LLC v. Lucic.134 In this case, a New York state trial court refused to
grant a preliminary injunction preventing one of three principals in a
company engaged in buy-out negotiations from “destroying or modifying” social media accounts and other digital assets.135 The trial court
refused to grant the injunction noting that under New York’s common
law tort of conversion, “the plaintiff must show legal ownership or an
immediate superior right to possession of a specific identifiable
thing.”136 The evidentiary record did not establish that the company
owned the social media accounts and other digital assets.137 The trial
court also noted that New York law requires the property at issue in a
common law conversion claim to be “[t]angible personal property or
specific money” and the social media accounts and other digital assets
“appear to be intangible property.”138
Pennsylvania is a jurisdiction that does not recognize social media
accounts as protectable property under the common law tort of conversion.139 In Eagle, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania examined whether a LinkedIn account is the kind of
property protected under Pennsylvania’s common law tort of conversion.140 It ruled it is not:
As the LinkedIn account is not tangible chattel, but rather an intangible right to access a specific page on a computer, Plaintiff is unable to state a cause of action for conversion.141
132. Salonclick, LLC v. SuperEgo Mgmt., LLC, No. 16 Civ. 2555 (KMW), 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6871, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2017).
133. Id. (quoting Ardis v. Nankivell, No. 11 Civ. 5013 (NRB), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120738,
at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2011)).
134. Fortified Holistic LLC v. Lucic, No. 711627/2017, 2017 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4482 at *9
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 13, 2017).
135. Id. at *7.
136. Id. at *8.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34220, at *28–29 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12,
2013).
140. Id. at *26–27.
141. Id. at *28–29.
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This ruling was relied upon in subsequent precedent. In Peruto v.
ROC Nation, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania explained the nature of intangible property rights under
Pennsylvania law concerning conversion and replevin actions.142 Citing the Eagle decision, the Peruto court noted that under Pennsylvania
law, a LinkedIn account does not constitute a property interest under
the common law tort of conversion.143 The district court explained this
precedent and other cases that applied this tort of conversion to intangible property interests as follows: “[t]hese decisions have noted the
limitation the Superior Court identified and concluded that, because
such digital property interests are both intangible, and not a form of
intangible property typically merged with particular documents, they
are not subject to conversion or replevin.”144
These divergent and, in certain cases, colliding judicial rationales
pose unique risks to business organizations that use social media to
advance core business interests. The unpredictability of the outcomes
associated with litigation over ownership rights in these accounts and
the uncertainty surrounding protectable property rights under the tort
of conversion increase the risk to these business organizations.145
142. Peruto v. Roc Nation, 386 F. Supp.3d 471, 475 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 2019).
143. Id. at 476.
144. Id. at 475–76.
145. What is clear from this precedent is the significant value these digital assets have as well
as the substantial harm to business interests when the right to own and control social media
accounts are violated. See Miss Global Org. LLC v. Mak, No. SA CV 17-2223-DOC (KESx),
2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113907, at 7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2019). The U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California noted it issued a preliminary injunction pursuant to a prior order.
See Miss Global Org. LLC v. Mak, No. SA CV 17-2223-DOC (KESx), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
225462, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2018), in which the district court ordered the immediate transfer of control over a Facebook account, the immediate delinking of an Instagram account from a
Facebook account, and an order to cease and desist posting on an Instagram account. In a previous ruling, the district court stated the allegedly unlawful control of Facebook and Instagram
accounts as well as the control of a company website threatened the company’s business reputation and goodwill, constituting “intangible injuries” that can satisfy the irreparable injury requirement. See Miss Global Org. LLC v. Mak, No. SA CV 17-2223-DOC (KESx), 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 225386, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2018); See also PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 1103474 MEJ, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10561, at *2–4 ( N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2012) (ruling that the
plaintiff had sufficiently pled a claim for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage through disruption in advertising revenue directly related to the plaintiff’s loss of control
over a Twitter account). See McGuire-Sobrino v. TX Cannalliance LLC, No. 05-19-01261-CV,
2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 6281, at *15 (Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2020); Int’l Bhd. Of Teamsters Local 651
v. Philbeck, 464 F. Supp. 3d 863, 873 (E.D. Ky. 2020); Mazo v. Merritt, No. 18-cv-00831-RBJ,
2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12766, at *20 (D. Colo. Jan. 28, 2019) (recognizing social media accounts
as “valuable property”). Caselaw also identifies social media accounts as digital assets subject to
contractual transfer and sale. See EEOC v. Danny’s Rest., LLC, No. 3:16-CV-00769-HTW-LRA,
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164062, at *21 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 25, 2018) (The U. S. District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi acknowledged that a “Bill of Sale and Assignment and Assumption Agreement” included as assets the sale of social media accounts.); see also Port Orchard

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\71-1\DPL103.txt

70

unknown

Seq: 24

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

11-FEB-22

13:57

[Vol. 71:47

C. Risk Exposure Increases for Business Organizations
The important and strategic business functions that social media accounts perform for business organizations146 underscore the significance of clear and predictable legal rules that provide property
protection when account ownership rights are threatened and challenged. When business organizations navigate a legal environment devoid of clarity, consistency, and uniformity in these ownership
disputes, their confidence in the predictive power of legal outcomes
wanes. The risk to business organizations rises as the boundary lines
for property rights in social media account ownership blurs. In broad
terms, these risks arise from the economic consequences resulting
from the temporary or permanent loss of control over a valuable digital asset. The costly litigation process associated with regaining control
over that asset increases these risks as well.
Scholarship on the nature of the risks arising from disputes over
social media account ownership and control identifies the threat of
economic losses to business organizations involved in social media account ownership disputes.147 These losses are tied to reputational risk
and brand diminution triggered by a business organization’s inability
to use and protect messaging on its social media accounts; revenue
risks arising from losing social media as a strategic advertising, sales,
and marketing tool; business disruption risk; and diminished competitive advantages through intellectual property misappropriation.148
Reputational risk derives from the critical messaging and branding
that social media performs for a business organization. Loss of control
over a social media account imperils these communication functions.
Business organizations may suffer a reputational black eye as a result
of adverse social media messaging and branding directly related to
loss of control over a business social media account or lose “reputation and prestige” associated with their brand when control of an account is lost.149 Caselaw adjudicating the legal rights at stake in social
Airport, Inc. v. Wagner, No. 52498-8-II, 2020 Wash. App. LEXIS 442, at *4 (Ct. App. Feb. 25,
2020) (The Washington Court of Appeals noted that a business organization’s sale of assets
pursuant to an asset purchase agreement included social media accounts.).
146. See infra Part II.A.
147. Hidy, supra note 47, at 487.
148. Id.
149. See Mastermind Involvement Mktg. v. Art Inst., 389 F. Supp. 3d 1291, 1295 (N.D. Ga.
2019) (The inability to market and advertise through the disputed social media accounts detrimentally impacted an art organization’s “reputation and business.”); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Local 651 v. Philbeck, 423 F. Supp. 3d 364, 375 (E.D. Ky. 2019) (recognizing that an organization’s
goodwill associated with its “reputation and prestige” is derived from use of its Facebook accounts and Facebook pages).
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media account ownership disputes recognizes that some forms of intellectual property theft can be intertwined with the misappropriation
of a social media account and can result in reputational harm to the
account’s owner.150
Revenue risk and business disruption risk151 increase as well when
social media account ownership disputes erupt. This occurs through
disruption to core business functions dependent on social media account access.152 A business organization sustains economic damage in
the form of lost revenue from lost sales as well as lost business opportunities from interrupted communication with clients and customers:
[S]ocial media accounts are engines of advertising, marketing, and
branding increasingly relied upon by business organizations to communicate, connect and transact with customers, clients, and the
public.153

Litigation risks to business organizations over social media account
ownership disputes arise from multiple factors. Changes in judicial
precedent154 or statutory laws155 impact the litigation risk to business
150. CDM Media USA, Inc. v. Simms, No. 14 CV 9111, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37458, at
*12–14 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2015) (noting a LinkedIn membership list may deserve protectable
trade secret status); Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Grp, No. 10 C 7811, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 26557, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2014) (loss of Twitter and Facebook account followers can
constitute a “marketable commercial interest” under a Lanham Act false endorsement claim);
Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34220, at *21–22 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2013)
(ruling that a hijacked LinkedIn account constituted unlawful misappropriation of identity);
Christou v. Beatport, LLC, 849 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1076 (D. Colo. 2012) (discussing the trade
secret status of the MySpace friends list); see also PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11-03474 MEJ,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129229, at *20 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011) (stating that Twitter account
followers and the password to a Twitter account may constitute protectible trade secrets).
151. Emerald City. Mgmt., LLC v. Khan, No. 4:120-cv-358, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2143, at
*62–67 (ruling that the unlawful takeover and control of a social media account can constitute
tortious interference with prospective business relationships under Texas common law);
PhoneDog, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10561, at *2–4 (citing potential intentional interference with
prospective economic advantage through disruption in advertising revenue directly related to
plaintiff’s loss of control over Twitter account).
152. McGuire-Sobrino v. TX Cannalliance LLC, No. 05-19-01261-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS
6281, at *15 (Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2020) (Interfering with an organization’s social media account
can cause business disruption, threaten injury to a business organization’s goodwill and reputation, loss of clientele, and the loss of the ability to market to customers in specific ways.).
153. Hidy, supra note 47, at 487; Constance E. Bagley, What’s Law Got to Do With It?: Integrating Law and Strategy, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 587, 614 (2010) (“However, it is increasingly difficult
to identify significant sources of firm value wherein legal rights are not important factors in
realizing that value. In particular, corporate knowledge, capabilities, and relationships are increasingly important sources of firm value creation. Management of these strategic knowledge
assets determines the company’s ability to survive, adapt, and compete and has significant legal
dimensions that remain largely unexplored in the relevant literatures.”).
154. Joel F. Houston et al., Litigation Risk and Voluntary Disclosure: Evidence from Legal
Changes, 94 THE ACCT. REV. 247, 251 (2019).
155. Id. at 266.
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organizations. In social media account ownership disputes, the law is
evolving to keep pace with technological innovations. This pacing
problem inherent in the digital rights revolution leaves litigants with
unpredictability and uncertainty in the pursuit of securing their
rights—the precedent presents unclear legal rules and even colliding
judicial rationales on the nature of their property rights at stake in
these disputes.156
Litigation risks also exist from “lengthy, protracted litigation” with
business resources diverted and expended on litigation costs in cases
where the calculation of “outcomes as to how courts will rule on specific legal questions and whether courts will adopt specific methodologies for valuation of social media accounts is difficult” at best and
potentially speculative.157 If sued for illegal conduct involving social
media account ownership and control, a business organization’s litigation risks include potential liability in the form of civil damages,158
including the award of punitive damages.159
The lack of coherence and uniformity in the judicial precedent adjudicating alleged property rights in social media account ownership disputes increases the risk exposure for business organizations who view
social media as a strategically important business asset and digital
tool. This pacing problem inherent in the digital revolution is overcome through a revolution in legal rights—a paradigm-shift in the law.
The path forward can be informed by looking back at legal history and
the developments that shaped property rights in Anglo-American
jurisprudence.
III. “WHAT’S PAST IS PROLOGUE:”160 A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
ON ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMON LAW PROPERTY RIGHTS
AND PARADIGM-SHIFTS IN THE LAW
As the pacing problem of the digital rights revolution persists and
judicial precedent fragments over the legal question about the nature
and extent of property rights in social media accounts, a paradigmshift in the analytical understanding of the conception of this legal
right can emerge. As Shakespeare reminds: “[w]hat’s past is prologue.”161 The lens of history provides perspective on the develop156. See infra Parts II.B.1, 2.
157. Hidy, supra note 47, at 486–87.
158. Bagley, supra note 153, at 607 (Civil damages resulting from non-compliance with legal
requirements can result in “a very negative monetary return.”).
159. Hidy, supra note 47, at 487.
160. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 2, at act 2, sc. 1.
161. Id.
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ment of property rights in the common law within the AngloAmerican legal tradition. Through understanding both the legal history and evolution of such rights within this legal tradition, as well as
the changing conception of the nature and meaning of property, a coherent and uniform approach to categorizing this property right can
be proposed. This historical past then becomes the prologue to a judicial or legislative resolution to the legal anomalies of the present.
The conception of property and the rights that protect it hold
“enormous importance in American legal thought.”162 The protection
of property in English common law dates back to at least the year
1100 with Henry I’s ascension to the English throne and the issuance
of the Coronation Charter.163 While legal scholars situate the AngloAmerican legal tradition’s understanding of property rights in the
writings of the seventeenth-century English philosopher and political
theorist John Locke, the English common law that developed over the
prior centuries embraced notions of property rights that are distinct
from Locke’s interpretation.164 Archival evidence demonstrates this:
the English common law’s understanding of property rights in relation
to land – the sine qua non recognized by the modern understanding of
property law in the Anglo-American tradition – is curiously absent for
200 years in English common law.165
In England in the period from 1290 to 1490, there was scant use in
common law of a word in legal advocacy to indicate a legally-protected property ownership interest in land.166 Archival scholarship
during this historical period evidences an association of property interests with domestic animals and with goods.167 However, instead of
identifying the good itself as distinct property, the legal terminology
used during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries to analyze property
rights pointed to property as an attribute: the assertion of rights was “I
162. David J. Seipp, The Concept of Property in the Early Common Law, 12 LAW & HIST.
REV. 29, 29 (1994).
163. Paul J. Larkin, The Original Understanding of “Property” in the Constitution, 100 MARQ.
L. REV. 1, 17 (2016); Coronation Charter of Henry I, 1100 AD, BRIT. LIBR., https://www.bl.uk/
collection-items/coronation-charter-of-henry-i (last visited Sept. 30, 2020).
164. Seipp, supra note 162, at 30 (explaining that the modern conception of property rights in
American law bears little resemblance to the notions embedded in English common law in certain centuries prior to philosopher John Locke’s articulation of the nature of property and the
rights derived from it during the Enlightenment period).
165. Id. at 31. The English word for “ownership” dates back to the sixteenth century although
archival evidence demonstrates that the word “owner” is used in English legal documents prior
to the sixteenth century. Id. at 72.
166. Id. at 33. The language used during this historical period in English common law advocacy that is preserved in historical writings was Anglo-Norman French.
167. Id.
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have property in it”168—not a direct assertion that one possesses the
property itself.169 Property was understood during this period to be a
characteristic of a good, such as a gem, or an attribute of a domestic
animal, such as a cow.170 Land, during this period, was delineated as a
“right”—called a “driet.”171 Conceptually, this “right” pertaining to
land under English common law recognized legally-protected interests
that included possessory interests; it also included hierarchically
higher interests than mere possessory interests which were called tenure and estates.172
This conceptual understanding of property rights contrasts with
what developed during the period before 1280, when the rudimentary
beginnings of English common law litigation employed a Latin term,
proprietas, to indicate an abstract form of a property right under English law.173 This concept of property rights used in this earlier period
– before 1280 – derived from a notion of property in goods, slaves,
and land that dates back hundreds of years to classical Rome.174
By the year 1500 – the beginning of the sixteenth century – English
common law began to recover a conception of property as an abstraction that earlier appeared in thirteenth-century English law:
The Year Books from 1490 onward gave the first indications in English common law discourse – the first since the earlier treatise tradition died out in the thirteenth century – of a universal, abstract
notion of “property rights” or a “law of property.” Here was a conceptual category with enough content of its own to begin reorienting English legal thinking toward assimilation of landholding,
consumption of goods, and use of animals.175

This is further evidenced in a discourse on common law written in
the early sixteenth century by English lawyer Christopher St.
Germain, titled Doctor and Student.176 In this treatise, the notion of
168. Id.
169. Id. at 33.
170. Id. This notion of property as an attribute is distinctive from later conceptions of property that evolved in English common law. For example, Blackstone’s Commentaries, published
in the eighteenth century, delineates property not as an attribute but as that which is separate,
independent, and external over which a person can legally assert exclusive dominion and control.
See WILLIAM C. SPRAGUE, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES ABRIDGED 105 (9th ed. 1915).
171. Seipp, supra note 162, at 39 (“Lawyers classified their writs regarding land into two sorts:
‘writs of possession’ and ‘writs of rights.’ In this scheme, ‘right’ was ‘greater’ or ‘higher’ than
possession.”).
172. Id. The author details archival evidence from this period that deviates from this analytical
framework. For example, in the year 1405, a judge of the King’s Bench court used the term
property in reference to a freehold and rights in land in his adjudication of a case. Id. at 65.
173. Id. at 32.
174. Id. at 33.
175. Id. at 34.
176. Id. at 74.
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private property is explained in universal and abstract terms as a
“human invention justified by its utility.”177
This legal evolution continued into the seventeenth century, and the
English conception of property under common law extended to land
as well as goods during this historical period.178 By expanding the concept of property to comprise both land and goods, the property rights
of the former began to share a kinship with the property rights of the
latter: “[i]n so doing, they carried over the conceptual trappings of
absolute property in goods and animals into the context of land disputes, and changed the way future generations of common lawyers
would talk and think about this new form of ‘property.’”179 Evidence
that the conception of property merged in the seventeenth century to
include both land and goods is found in the writings of Edward Coke.
In 1600, Coke published the first installment of his Reports – the same
year he served as Attorney General – and in 1615, while serving as
Chief Justice of the King’s Bench, Coke’s eleventh volume of his Reports was published.180 These writings employ the term “property”
primarily in the context of goods and animals, not land; by 1628,
Coke’s additional writings continued this use but with some additional
references to land as property.181
John Locke’s philosophical exposition of property rights arises
within this historical context182 and is captured in William Blackstone’s 1766 Commentaries on the Laws of England 2, a foundational
text in Anglo-American common law property rights:
For Blackstone, this right of property was ‘that sole and despotic
dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external
things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.’183

In 1765, the first volume of Blackstone’s Commentaries appeared;
twelve years prior William Blackstone commenced his lectures on the
study of law at Oxford.184 Three additional volumes of the Commentaries followed in the following four years.185
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 76.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 80–81.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 29, n.1 (quoting 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
GLAND (1766)).
184. SPRAGUE, supra note 170, at vii.
185. Id.

ON THE

LAWS

OF

EN-
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Blackstone’s account of the nature of property and the rights derived from it under English common law are foundational writings on
which American common law jurisprudence is built.186 In Blackstone’s Commentaries, the eighteenth-century conception of English
common law property rights looks markedly different from the centuries that preceded it. Blackstone explains that property itself exists
independent, external, and separate from the owner; he casts ownership over property as a form of domination or control: “[t]he objects
of dominion or property are things, as contra-distinguished from persons.”187 Of note, common law in England at this juncture in history
has a merged understanding of property that includes both land and
goods, as well as a nuanced analytical framework based on abstract
principles to explain distinctions between the two:
[A]nd things are by the law of England distributed into two kinds;
things real and things personal. Things real are such as permanent,
fixed, immovable, which cannot be carried out their place, as lands
and tenements; things personal are goods, money, and all other
movables; which may attend the owner’s person wherever he thinks
proper to go.188

By the eighteenth century, English common law employed this universal, abstract conception of property to define and categorize types
of property interests recognized in law. Blackstone writes in his Commentaries that “chattels” is a property designation that attaches to
both land (chattels real) as well as to persons (chattels personal).189
The latter is characterized by the moveable nature of the property and
the power a person can exercise over the object; chattels personal are:
186. Bernard H. Siegan, Propter Honoris Respectum: Separation of Powers & Economic Liberties, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 415, 422 n.18 (1995) (The author notes the influence John
Locke, Edward Coke, and William Blackstone had on American jurisprudence. Specifically, the
author identifies the significance of Blackstone’s Commentaries as:
[T]he first important and the most influential systematic statement of the principles of
the common law. For generations of English lawyers, it has been both the foremost
coherent statement of the subject of their study, and the citadel of their legal tradition.
To lawyers on this side of the Atlantic, it has been even more important. In the first
century of American independence, the Commentaries were not merely an approach to
the study of law; for most lawyers they constituted all there was of the law . . . . And
many an early American lawyer might have said, with Chancellor Kent, that ‘he owed
his reputation to the fact that when studying law . . . he had but one book, Blackstone’s
Commentaries, but that one book he mastered.’
Id. (quoting DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAW 3 (1941) (further
quoting CHARLES WARREN, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 187 (1911))). The writings of
Edward Coke were also a profound influence on common law in the Anglo-American legal
tradition. Id. at 422 n.17.
187. SPRAGUE, supra note 170, at 107.
188. Id. at 107–08.
189. Id. at 242–43.
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[P]roperly and strictly speaking, things movable; which may be annexed to or attendant on the person of the owner, and carried about
with him from one part of the world to another. Such are animals,
household stuff, money, jewels, corn, garments, and everything else
that can properly be put in motion and transferred from place to
place.190

This taxonomy of common law property rights continues – mirroring the Enlightenment aims of rationality and scientific progress – in
Blackstone’s acknowledgment of “still another species of property”
that is “grounded on labour and invention” and protected under English law: “[a]nd this is a right which an author may be supposed to
have in his own original literary composition: so that no other person
without his leave may publish or make profit of the copies.”191 Blackstone’s Commentaries acknowledges that the legal right to property
necessitates that English common law provides remedies when those
rights are abused.192 These remedies include an action of replevin as
well as actions of trover and conversion.193 In an action of replevin,
Blackstone instructs: “[a]nd this is, in the first place the restitution of
the goods themselves so wrongfully taken, with the damages for the
loss sustained by such unjust invasion; which is effected by action of
replevin.”194 This differs from the legal remedy of trover and conversion, recognized in English common law: “for the recovery of damages
against such person as had found another’s goods and refused to deliver them on demand; but converted them to his own use; from which
finding and converting it is called an action of trover and
conversion.”195
The English common law was carried to America by English colonists,196 and planted in the American colonies’ jurisprudence before
the American Revolution and the founding of the United States,
events that together close the eighteenth century and begin the nine190. Id. at 243.
191. Id. at 251.
192. Id. at 334.
193. Id. at 334, 337.
194. Id. at 334.
195. Id. at 337.
196. Letter from Johnathan Sewall to John Adams (Sept. 29, 1759), NAT’L ARCIHVES, https://
founders.archives.gov/?q=william%20blackstone%20commentaries. Fellow lawyer Jonathan
Sewall remarks in his letter to John Adams that John Adams’s “[a]ccount of Mr. Blackstone’s
Lectures is entirely new to me, but I am greatly pleased with it.” The National Archives’ annotation of this letter states that this reference is likely to William Blackstone’s Analysis of the Laws
of England, a treatise published in 1754 as a companion to William Blackstone’s lectures at
Oxford and a precursor of Blackstone’s Commentaries. Id. at n.4.
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teenth century.197 As one historian notes, the American Revolution
was a revolt against English rule but not a revolt against English
law:198
The Colonists’ decision to break from England was different in
character from contemporary revolutions. Seeing English customs
and rights as an invaluable benefit, more valuable than even England’s military or commercial power, the Colonists brought their
legal traditions with them to the New World.199

The English colonies in America attracted settlers, in part, because
the English legal tradition of securing through law “security, liberty,
and property” – Blackstone’s trinity of “absolute rights of Englishmen” – continued in Colonial America.200 Specifically, the conception
of property in the colonial period mirrored the English view: “American political leaders did not develop new ideas about private property.
They merely demanded that the concept of property long since canonized by the English Whigs also apply in the colonies.”201
Legal scholars and historians remark that the American Founding
philosophically embraced a conception of the meaning of property
more expansive than mere “private holdings, both personal and
real.”202 This expansive understanding of property included these private holdings as well as political and civil rights upon which liberty
interests depended.203 The Americans and English shared this eighteenth-century view of property rights,204 and the former embedded
this view in the drafting of the U.S. Constitution.205 U.S. Supreme
Court constitutional jurisprudence recognizes the importance of An197. See generally Barbara Stark, Deconstructing the Framers’ Right to Property: Liberty’s
Daughters and Economic Rights, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 963, 973 (2000) (noting the English historical origins of Colonial America’s understanding of rights, including the right to property which
had a “privileged place in colonial jurisprudence”). Id. at 974.
198. Siegan, supra note 186, at 452.
199. Larkin, supra note 163, at 21.
200. Id. at 23; Siegan, supra note 186, at 451 (“From the earliest years of the English state,
judges and parliament created and steadily expanded common law protections. As an example,
at one time, only the meager rudiments of criminal procedure were required; by Blackstone’s
day, however, ‘absolute rights’ to life, liberty, and property were acknowledged.”).
201. Larkin, supra note 163, at 25 (quoting WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS 189 (Rita
& Robert Kimber trans., Rowman & Littlefield, expanded ed. 2001) (1973)).
202. Stark, supra note 197, at 975.
203. Id.; Larkin, supra note 163, at 33.
204. Larkin, supra note 163, at 33.
205. Id. at 36. James Madison, the fourth President of the United States and architect of the
U.S. Constitution, wrote about this expansive conception of property in 1792: “[i]n its larger and
juster meaning, [it] embraces every thing to which a man may attach a value and have a right;
and which leaves to every one else the like advantage.” Id. at 34–35 (quoting James Madison,
Essay, NAT’L GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1792, at 174.).
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glo-American legal history to guide the meaning of terms used in provisions of the U.S. Constitution.206
While legal historians agree that the colonial and early American
legal tradition embraced core aspects of the English common law (and
the philosophical assumptions undergirding the law),207 evidence exists that the American legal tradition rebelled against, rejected, and
replaced aspects of this English legal tradition, including the conception of property rights:208
There was a difference between what the Colonists said in defense
of their decision to break with England, or what the Framers said
when discussing the principles that underlay the new government
they sought to charter, and what the Colonists and Framers actually
did when their hands were on the wheel. They did not translate in
its entirety and without modification their philosophical and rhetorical understanding of property into the legal institution of property
governed by the former colonial or new federal political
institutions.209

Legal historians maintain that in Colonial America, property rights
did adapt to the unique economic, political, and social circumstances
of the New World, including the right to hold land in fee simple, a
right unfettered by the feudal land system in England.210 The right to
secure property interests in law at the time of the American Revolution and founding of the United States included the “right to possess,
use, enjoy, and dispose” of land, currency, and goods or commodities.211 This American adaptation of laws to address the colonists’ specific circumstances worked through colonial legislatures that retained
the right to legislate, and through colonial courts that retained the
right to adjudicate legal disputes.212
206. Id. at 3.
207. See Siegan, supra note 186, at 422 n.18 (acknowledging the reliance American law had
even after the American Revolution on Blackstone’s Commentaries’ explication of English law,
stating, “[t]o lawyers on this side of the Atlantic, it has been even more important. In the first
century of American independence, the Commentaries were not merely an approach to the
study of law; for most lawyers they constituted all there was of the law . . . . ”).
208. STUART BANNER, AMERICAN PROPERTY: A HISTORY OF HOW, WHY, AND WHAT WE
OWN 4 (2011).
209. Larkin, supra note 163, at 73.
210. Id. at 29.
211. Id. at 6.
212. Claire Priest, Creating an American Property Law: Alienability and Its Limits in American History, 120 HARV. L. REV. 385, 398 (2006) (quoting DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE 44-45 (2005)) The author states:
English property law served as the foundation for the property law of the colonies. The
charters and patents that conveyed legislative power to the colonies generally included
provisos either prohibiting colonial legislatures from making laws ‘repugnant to’ the
laws of England or requiring that the enacted laws be ‘not contrary to but as near as
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Another example of American deviation from the English conception of property and the legal protections afforded it involves land:
during the colonial period, land became the legal equivalent of chattel
in the American legal tradition.213 This commodification of land transformed in a unique way an American understanding of property that
is distinctive from the English common law tradition.214 Achieved by
colonial legislation and a British Parliamentary act,215 Colonial
America viewed property rights in land as the legal equivalent of chattel for creditor/debtor claims:
In America, the treatment of land as legally equivalent to any other
form of chattel in relation to creditors’ claims obliterated the division between landed wealth and commercial wealth, and thus between landowners and merchants. In America, before the 1840s, all
forms of wealth were subject to the commercial risks incurred by
the property owner, with the exceptions of land that was entailed
during the colonial period and land that was covered by a widow’s
limited dower interest.216

One nineteenth-century lawyer in 1829 described the American
transformation of English property law from the mid-eighteenth century explication of the law in Blackstone’s Commentaries to the
American Founding as “a complete revolution.”217 Lawyers, judges,
and legislators in the colonies and the newly-formed United States
remodeled and crafted legal theories in the area of property ownership and rights according to the political, economic, and geographic
realities of America: “American judges and legislators were constantly
replacing ancient doctrines with new ones. Few areas of the law, if
any, were changing more rapidly than property.”218
conveniently may be made agreeable to the Laws, Statutes & Government of this Our
Realm of England.’ Id.
213. Priest, supra note 212, at 389.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 389 (analyzing the transformational impact of the British Parliament’s Act for the
More Easy Recovery of Debts in His Majesty’s Plantations and Colonies in America known as
the Debt Recovery Act of 1732, and American colonial laws on America’s departure from English legal tradition through allowing real property to be used as security for debts.).
216. Id. at 390.
217. BANNER, supra note 208, at 4.
218. Id. The shaping of a republic during this period in history impacted the American reaction to English conceptions of property rights that failed to live up to republican ideals. Gregory
S. Alexander, Time and Property in the American Republican Legal Culture, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV.
273, 350–351 (1991) (highlighting how the American discourse on the meaning of property during the period 1765 to 1800 embodied a dialectic that included a reaction to Blackstone’s notion
of property: “the Blackstonian conception of ownership was a myth in the context of English
society. Indeed, they considered that ownership based on individual autonomy and equality had
not in fact existed anywhere in history. The common law, in developing the concept of the feesimple absolute, had articulated that ideal, but had not actually implemented the common-law
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This expectation and effectuation of change in property rights in
America219 becomes the historical backdrop for the next two centuries
of legal evolution of these rights in the United States. This historical
period stretches over a vast legal landscape, with sweeping changes in
the legal understanding of the nature of property and the nature of
the rights securing these interests. It includes the acknowledgement
and articulation of intellectual property rights220—legal protections
that continued to strengthen as the value of the property itself increases.221 These intangible rights have roots in legal doctrines embedded in the English common law, but they grew and flowered in
American jurisprudence through judicial rulings and legislative
enactments:
[I]intellectual property had become an important part of the law,
and the types of intellectual property had multiplied to include not
just patents and copyrights but also trade secrets and trademarks
with their associated goodwill. All were ways of owning information, a commodity that would grow ever more valuable, and would
be the subject of even newer kinds of property, in the twentieth
century.222

As the understanding of property rights transformed over time, the
United States debated and recognized property interests in a genetically engineered bacterium,223 human tissue and blood,224 public
school jobs,225 and an individual’s identity.226
Throughout American history, property law in the United States
also evolved conceptually through the works of English legal theorists,
such as law professor John Austin. Austin, in his Lectures on Jurisprudence which was published in the 1860s, popularized the notion that
property was a bundle of rights, such as the right to use or to exideal. Because the common-law conception of ownership as the fee-simple absolute had not
existed anywhere previously, it had not fulfilled its promise of individual liberation.”).
219. BANNER, supra note 208, at 22.
220. Id. at 32 (discussing American courts’ recognition in the mid-nineteenth century that
trademarks constituted a distinct form of legally protectable property. In 1860, Francis Upton’s
Treatise on the Law of Trademarks explained that ownership of a trademark derived not from
owning a “word” but from owning the “right to use that word to designate a particular
product.”).
See FRANCIS UPTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS 14–15 (1860).
221. BANNER, supra note 208, at 37. In 1887, then Cincinnati, Ohio, state court judge (and
future 27th President of the United States and Chief Justice of the U. S. Supreme Court) William
Howard Taft ruled that an employer’s trade secret is a legally protected form of property. Id. at
43.
222. Id. at 44.
223. Id. at 252.
224. Id. at 246
.
225. Id. at 235.
226. Id. at 160.
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clude.227 This view, embraced in English and American law, prevailed
on both sides of the Atlantic by the end of the nineteenth century.228
Legal theorists continue to debate what theoretical constructs should
be used to conceptualize the meaning of property under the AngloAmerican legal tradition.229
IV.

THE FEASIBILITY

OF A

UNIFORM APPROACH
RISKS

TO

MITIGATE

This historical perspective on the development of property rights in
the Anglo-American legal tradition invites investigation of the feasibility of a uniform approach to the categorization and adjudication of
the property rights at stake in social media account ownership. First,
this legal history – spanning 900 years – confirms that paradigm-shifts
do occur.230 Even before the American Revolution and the American
Founding, aspects of the American legal development of property
rights in the American colonial period have been characterized as “a
complete revolution”231 or a rebellion from its English parentage.
Second, lawyers, judges, and legislators remodeled and crafted legal
theories in the area of property rights according to the political, economic, and geographic realities of the American colonies.232 This
pragmatic approach embedded in the American legal tradition allows
this tradition to adapt to new realities, adjust to specific circumstances, and create new legal rights when needed.233 This historical
perspective lends legitimacy to the pressing problem posed by the digital rights revolution: the inability of the law to keep pace with technological innovation.234
Third, a paradigm-shift in this area of law and the adoption of a new
legal paradigm are justified.235 The digital rights revolution’s pacing
problem is evident as litigation over disputed social media account
227. Id. at 57–58.
228. Id. at 58. The author notes the constitutional implications of this theoretical construct as
well. Id. at 69.
229. Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1697–98 (2012).
230. See infra Part III.
231. BANNER, supra note 208, at 4.
232. Larkin, supra note 163, at 29.
233. Id.
234. See infra Part I.
235. See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Grokking Grokster, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1217, 1231. The author examines fundamental differences between “property pragmatists” and “property idealists”
in light of copyright law’s reaction to new digital technologies. The author notes that the “nonlinear nature of progress” theorized by Joseph Schumpeter and Thomas Kuhn should be applied
to law’s reaction to the creative destruction of technological innovation. Id. at 1276.
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ownership creates divergent and inconsistent legal outcomes.236 These
anomalies in the precedent create significant risks for the rights-holders whose property interests in this valuable digital asset – a social
media account – are neither clearly defined nor reliably certain.237
The need exists for a judicial or legislative rejection of legal constructs
that do not adequately and fairly account for the rights at stake in
social media account ownership disputes.
Significant obstacles exist to a judicial adoption of a new legal paradigm. With no statute directly addressing the parameters of the property rights attendant in social media account ownership disputes, the
caselaw demonstrates that litigants advance multiple legal theories –
arising under both statutory law and common law – to redress the
harm resulting from loss of control over a social media account.238
Each legal theory requires courts to interpret and apply elements of
that statute or common law framework to the technological idiosyncrasies of each kind of social media platform. This can and has produced disparate and divergent outcomes, and analytically confusing
and conflicting frameworks. In addition, each state articulates the elements of the common law tort of conversion according to its precedent. There is no uniformity in the states’ varied approaches to
categorizing this common law right of recovery to intangible property
such as a social media account.239 Proposing a single, uniform analytical framework for the judiciary’s use when confronted by these diverse legal theories and varied articulations of the common law is not
practical. A new legal paradigm is best approached legislatively.
A legislative approach avoids these obstacles and resolves the
anomalies now present in the judicial precedent. A blueprint for such
a legislative undertaking exists. The digital revolution’s disruptive impact in trust and estates law provides insight into how a paradigm-shift
through a legislative response creates new, coherent, and uniform legal rules to address problems arising from technology innovations.
The Revised Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act
(RUFADAA) is a model law that addresses access questions to certain digital assets when a person dies or loses the capacity to control
these assets.240 The Uniform Law Commission drafted RUFADAA,
236. See infra Parts II.B.1, 2.
237. See infra Part II.C.
238. See infra Parts II.B.1,.2.
239. See infra Part II.B.2.
240. See UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, REVISED UNIFORM FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT (2015).
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and versions have been adopted in almost all fifty states.241 This
model law grants a fiduciary, such as an executor or trustee, certain
kinds of access to “manage digital assets” of a decedent or other represented person, and the model law delineates the consent and documentation required for access to certain digital assets, including social
media accounts.242
The drafting and revision of this uniform law occurred after several
states enacted statutes to address these issues.243 In 2014, a model law
drafted by the Uniform Law Commission “treated digital assets like
any other property in a decedent’s estate.”244 Internet companies opposed this characterization of a digital asset, prompting an industry
group to propose an alternative statutory reform.245 In reaction to industry push back, the Uniform Law Commission revised its model
law; the RUFADAA is that iteration of this effort.246 This progression
illustrates the path a model law may travel from idea to adoption. The
path traversed may begin with unilateral state legislative action and
then proceed to the drafting and proposal of a uniform law. If an industry rejects some or all of the elements of the proposed legislation,
redrafting may be necessary in light of industry efforts to lobby and
pressure for change in the proposed law.247
A model law that addresses the following issues will provide a coherent and uniform approach to property rights in social media account ownership disputes. This model law should:
(1) Define a social media account as a form of intangible, personal
property;
241. Access to Digital Assets of Decedents, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures (Mar. 26,
2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/access-todigital-assets-of-decedents.aspx.
242. Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act, Revised, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://
www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey (last visited July 23, 2020);
Shelly Kreiczer-Levy & Ronit Donyets-Kedar, Better Left Forgotten: An Argument Against
Treating Some Social Media and Digital Assets as Inheritance in an Era of Platform Power, 84
BROOK. L. REV. 703, 716 (2019); UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, supra note 240, § 7 (One legislative challenge in the drafting and adoption of this model law was determining the nature and
extent of the fiduciary’s access to the digital assets.).
243. Natalie M. Banta, Electronic Wills and Digital Assets: Reassessing Formality in the Digital
Age, 71 BAYLOR L. REV. 547, 569 (2019). Connecticut was the first state to legislate in this area
in 2005. Id.
244. Id. at 570.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 571.
247. Id. (“Digital asset reform under RUFADAA is a cautionary tale for uniform law in the
United States. On a national level, there was enough opposition from online companies to stunt
the evolution of freedom of disposition in the digital realm.”).
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(2) Acknowledge that a social media account can be owned and
transferred;
(3) Designate ownership of a social media account through evidence of account creation and account management and contractual transfer of the account;
(4) Designate the exercise of dominion or control over a social media account in a manner that seriously interferes with the account owner’s right to access and control the account as
unlawful;
(5) Provide civil remedies for this unlawful exercise of dominion
and control; and
(6) Acknowledge that other forms of property can be communicated through social media such as intellectual property in the
form of trade secrets and trademarks.
This proposed framework imports key components of the Restatement 2d of Torts’ definition of conversion as well as standards employed in the judicial precedent interpreting this tort.248 Section 1 of
the proposed legislation explicitly defines a social media account as
intangible personal property, removing confusion created by courts
over whether intangible property constitutes protectable property
under the tort of conversion.249 Further, Section 1 uses the more generic term “property” and not “chattel” to avoid entangling this
model law in state-specific precedent that interprets the meaning of
“chattel” under common law.250 Section 2 of the model law states that
social media accounts retain indicia of property including ownership,
control, and transferability. Section 3 of this model law provides a
framework for the determination of the ownership of a social media
account. This will legislatively resolve the multiple and, at times, conflicting analyses courts use to understand and resolve ownership disputes over social media accounts.251
Section 4 mirrors the language used in the Restatement 2d of
Torts.252 It requires a “serious” interference of the property owner’s
right to access and control of the social media account.253 This stan248. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 77, § 222A; see infra Part II.B.2.
249. Pertuto v. Roc Nation, 386 F. Supp. 3d 471, 475–76 (E.D. Pa. 2019); Eagle v. Morgan, No.
11-4303, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34220, at *28–29 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2013) (“As the LinkedIn
account is not tangible chattel, but rather an intangible right to access a specific page on a computer, Plaintiff is unable to state a cause of action for conversion.”).
250. See infra Part II.B.2.
251. Int’l Bhd. Of Teamster Local 651 v. Philbeck, 464 F. Supp. 3d 863, 871–72 (E.D. Ky.
2020); C.D.S., Inc. v. Zetler, 298 F. Supp. 3d 727, 750 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
252. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 77, § 222A.
253. See Prosser, supra note 76, at 173.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\71-1\DPL103.txt

86

unknown

Seq: 40

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

11-FEB-22

13:57

[Vol. 71:47

dard will require judicial interpretation of what constitutes “serious”
interference with the property right. The development of that precedent can look to caselaw interpreting this language in the Restatement
2d of Torts. Section 5 of the model law delineates the nature of the
statutory remedy, and Section 6 explicitly allows for other forms of
property – such as a trademark – to exist coextensively with the property right in the social media account itself. This preserves as a separate cause of action the intellectual property right contained within
the social media, clearing up judicial confusion over this issue.254
This legislative approach provides a new paradigm that resolves the
anomalies inherent in the digital rights revolution’s pacing problem. A
model law adopting this legislative approach establishes the nature of
the property inherent in social media accounts, articulates a methodology for determining account ownership, and provides a statutory
right and remedy to account owners damaged by interference with
these property rights. Business organizations relying on this legislative
framework gain clarity about their property rights in their social media accounts. The model law also provides business organizations consistent and uniform legal rules if disputes arise over social media
account ownership and control. This paradigm-shift in the law mitigates the risks resulting from loss of ownership and control over this
valuable digital asset.
V. CONCLUSION
The digital rights revolution confirms that technological advances
challenge and upend the understanding and application of legal rights.
Litigation over social media account ownership disputes produces judicial precedent anomalies, with divergent, contradictory, or unclear
analytical frameworks applied by courts to adjudicate the rights at issue. Business organizations encounter increased exposure to risk in
the wake of this problematic precedent. Defining and delineating
ownership rights over this digital asset through a uniform legislative
approach informed by historical context provides the judiciary, legislators, legal scholars, and legal practitioners a new paradigm. This paradigm-shift mitigates the risk posed to business organizations, allowing
them to understand and secure their rights to a useful and valuable
asset: social media accounts.

254. See CDM Media USA, Inc. v. Simms, No. 14 CV 9111, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37458, at
*12–14 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2015); Christou v. Beatport, LLC, 849 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1076 (D. Colo.
2012).

